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Abstract
Previous research indicates that both preschoolers and young elementary
school children perceive integral and separable stimuli holistically. However, whereas
older children and adults apprehend integral objects as global wholes, they apprehend
separable objects in terms of constituent attributes. Although dimensional integrality is
an important determinant ofperformance in perceptual classification tasks, the role
stimulus integrality plays in other cognitive tasks is less clear.
The present experiments explored the effects of stimulus integrality on second,
fourth and sixth grade children's performance on classical analogical reasoning tasks
in the form of A:B::C:D. Analogical reasoning was chosen because it is a cognitive
task that forces the reasoner to take a very analytic approach to the stimuli. Two
experiments tested whether children's performance on a pictorial analogy task was
affected by the integrality or separability of attributes in the pictures.
Although children were able to solve analogies with both integral and separable
stimuli, reaction times for solving analogies composed of separable stimuli were much
longer than for analogies composed of integral stimuli. With the integral stimuli,
reaction times for children in all grades were affected by the number of attribute
changes from the A to B terms but not by the number of attribute changes from the A
to C terms. In contrast, with the separable stimuli, ..children's reaction times did not
vary with the number of attribute changes between A and B or A and C.
Thus, the effects of attribute changes differed for integral and separable stimuli
1
..
and these effects did not differ across age groups. Based on these findings, it is argued
that the perceived structure of the stimulus remains an important consideration even in
a highly analytic cognitive task. When the present findings are considered in the
context ofprior studies with integral and separable stimuli, it is evident that an .
interactive model of task performance is needed which takes into account not only the
age ofthe child, but also the characteristics of the stimuli and requirements of the task.
.. ~ 2
Children's Analogical Reasoning with Integral and Separable Stimuli
The ways in which children make sense of the physical environment have been
of interest to psychologists since the time of William James when he described the
infant's world as one of "...blooming, buzzing confusion" (James, 1890).
Developmental psychologists have been particularly interested in perceptual
development as one of the key aspects of children's burgeoning ability to understand
and make use of their environment. Although perception is crucial, itis not sufficient
for functioning in the world.
In order for a task to be performed or a problem to be solved, several
components of the situation must be understood. Specifically, the reasoner must
comprehend the task and must be capable ofperceiving the object or the situation. The
processes in which the reasoner engages will be dependent on these abilities of
understanding and perception. In other words, there is an interaction between the task
demands, the child's level ofperceptual and cognitive development, and the physical
characteristics or structure of objects in the environment.
Because the world in which children live is complex, it is not surprising that
different discriminations are necessary in different situations. For example, a child
may look at a block in a global way when playing with it, whereas the same block may
be given a more analytic examination when determining where to place it in a shape
sorter. Therefore, the particular task being completed can have an effect on precisely
what is perceived.
The physical characteristics of the units or objects being detected can limit or
bias perception. J. J. Gibson (1960) was one ofthe fitst psychologists to highlight the
way in which the physical structure ofthe array or stimulus in the environment affects
cognitive processing. Garner (1974) emphasized the need for a distinction between
stimulus information that is processed holistically by the perceptual system and
stimulus information that is processed in terms ofcomponent parts. These perceptual
structures have been named integral and separable, respectively. The perceptual system
processes stimuli composed of integral attributes as wholes, in contrast stimuli
composed of separable dimensions are processed independently.
In addition to variations in tasks and stimuli, there are also characteristics of the
perceiver which have an effect on perception. Since perception is not a simple, passive
registration of the world, it is also dependent on the experience, development, and age of
the perceiver. Several theorists have noted that the perceptions ofyoung children are
dominated by perceptions ofundifferentiated wholes (Gibson, 1969; Piaget, 1954). As
children become older, the specific dimensions of an object are perceived as more salient.
Motivated by this insight, researchers have explored the interaction between perceived
stimulus structure and cognitive development. One conclusion that emerged was that
performance on a task depends on the kinds of stimulus dimensions, the age of the
perceiver, and the demands of the task.
When speeded tasks are used, both children and adults are often influenced by
global properties ofthe stimulus (Barrett & Shepp, 1988; Shepp & Swartz, 1976; Kemler,
1983; Kemler & Smith, 1979).H:owever, ~hen time constraints are removed and when
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children are simply told to put together those items "that go together best," preschoolers
tend to base their groupings on global similarity relations, whereas older elementary
school children base their decisions on shared dimensional values (Kemler & Smith,
1979; Shepp, 1989; Smith & Kemler, 1977) A few researchers have asked children to
classify the same things several times in different ways in order to increase the likelihood
children would demonstrate analytic responding. Although these manipulations have
resulted in more analytic processing, there still remained differences in classification
which could be attributed to differences in stimulus structure (Burns, 1992; Smith &
Kemler, 1977). The question arises as to whether differences in perceived dimensional
structure persist in the context of a task which requires highly analytic thinking.
Reasoning by analogy is a task which requires the reasoner to analyze the relation
between a pair of items and then apply that relation to another pair of items. The task
requirements force the reasoners to analyze the elements contained in the analogy.
Because of these requirements, reasoning by analogy can be used to demonstrate whether
differences in perceived stimulus structure affect children's performance in an analytic
task.
Although,there has been disagreement in the literature as to the emergence of
children's ability to reason by analogy, their performance can be fostered by using
objects and terms with which they are familiar and by training the chiJdren in the precise
task requirements. In the present experiments, an analogical reasoning task was used to
evaluate whether differences in perceived structure affect children's performance on a
~_.:..: ._" , ~_. -_ -- - __ . - --_ _--- :...:....~,~~~-;::;:...,. ,'_.~;_.:.:...- ---_·_----------~~-_·_·-'--I
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highly analytic task. The analogical reasoning task I selected is one children can solve by
comparing attributes that either change or remain constant across a set ofpictures. After I
review the literature on perceptual development, I will review the literature on analogical
reasoning and present evidence that simple picture analogies can be used to evaluate
analytic processing of integral and separable stimuli in young elementary school children.
Perceptual Development
Theories ofperception attempt to explain the processes that bridge the
considerable gap between sensory stimulation and the experience of an external object,
environment, or event. There is a long history of theories ofperception, with an
astonishing variety. Perceptual theories range from passive to active theories. In passive
theories, perception is viewed as essentially camera-like. It conveys selected aspects of an
object quite directly, as though the eyes and the brain are undistorting windows, without
any active input from the perceiver. Children perceive, not by using cues to infer the
world and objects from sensory data, but by viewing features of an object which are
available directly, without effort (Gregory, 1991). Active theories posit that perception is
constructed by complex brain processes from momentary piecemeal scraps ofdata
received by the senses and combined with information derived from past experiences
(Gregory, 1991). Hence, in the active theory view, perception is constructed from the
present stimulus and past experience.
Theories which view perception as an active process differ in how they regard the
information or array that is available for perception. Enrichment theories consider the
::.::..:..:~~.:.::~.:.:..:.:.::=.=::==:::~=:stimulus:.::.tQ:he'relati.Y,ely:imp.QVJ:~ri~h~d.=.Qr.:aHe.asHnagequ.at.stfQr:,~;tI1!eJm~tw.te,dge",~~lrt--:· .....::,:::~::;:::::.:::.::;::.:::;;::.,~
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contrast, differentiation theories propose that the array or stimulus in the environment
contains all of the information necessary for perception.
Piaget's theory has been referred to as an example of an enrichment theory of
perception. Piaget (1954) has proposed that young children perceive objects as
undifferentiated wholes. Then, as development progresses, and children have more and
varied experiences with objects, objects are perceived on the basis oftheir component
parts or dimensions. Piaget's view is that sensory stimuli are vague and ambiguous.
Meaning, then, has to be constructed by using cognitive structures to add to or enrich the
stimulus (piaget, 1985). Thus, in order to be understood, the stimulus alone is not
adequate, rather it must be enriched by the perceiver using the cognitive structures
available at that developmental level.
The differentiation theory ofperceptual development is exemplified by the
perceptual theory ofE. J. Gibson. Differentiation theories in general and E. J. Gibson's
(1969) theory in particular, propose that the sensory stimuli which exist in the world
contain all of the information needed to understand thatworld. With development, the
child acquires the ability to detect the differentiating features contained in the stimuli.
Eleanor Gibson's theory ofperceptual development.
J. J. and E. J. Gibson have had a great deal of influence in the area ofperceptual
development. While J. J. Gibson formulated the ecological approach to visual perception
(J. J. Gibson, 1960, 1979), both he and E. J. Gibson proposed an active theory of
perception, specifically postulating that in the world there are "lasting objects" whose
7
infonnation is there to be obtained, objects do not have to be constructed, "one does not
construct truth" (E. 1. Gibson, 1991; 1. 1. Gibson & E. 1. Gibson, 1991). In her conception
ofperceptual learning, E. 1. Gibson postulates that the result ofperceptual learning is an
increasing specificity of correspondences between the infonnation in the stimulus and
what is perceived. Perception is accomplished by searching for invariant properties in the
world. This search is done by animals, as well as by humans, both ofwhom are traversing
through the world, when they try to perceive the spatial layout and locate objects (E. J.
Gibson, 1991). Therefore, perception cannot be viewed as a static snapshot of the object
or environment being perceived. For E. 1. Gibson, the mechanism needed for perception
is abstraction, perhaps better described as an extraction ofthe relevant infonnation from
all of the available infonnation. This extraction depends on the species, the infonnation
must be that which the species is physically equipped to extract. Extraction also depends
on developmental maturity. A human infant's ability to differentiate and identify
stationary objects is certainly inferior to that of a 10 year old child. The extraction of
relevant infonnation is also dependent on learning, which includes learning which is
common to a species because oftheir ecology and sensory systems, but includes also
idiosyncratic learning by an individual member of that species (E. J. Gibson, 1991a).
According to both E. 1. Gibson (1969) and 1. 1. Gibson (1960; 1979), objects and
events are perceived from the beginning of life, but without much differentiation. The
ability to perceive distinctive features (which are the minimal set of features that
distinguish an object) as relational, contrasting properties that are useful to distinguish
8
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one thing from another is what develops. Children learn to attend to the distinctive
features of things, to the invariants, which are the relations that remain constant over
change and are the essence ofperception (J. J. Gibson, 1979). Trends in perceptual
development emerge as the product ofboth experience with the particular environment
and the maturing ability of the individual (E. J. Gibson, 1969). Perc~tion is an active,
exploratory process which is selective from infancy. The mechanisms of exploration
develop, and their efficiency increases as new action systems become available. The
developing child has many avenues of exploration, including listening, looking, tasting,
scanning, licking, palpating. Exploratory activity begins early in life, yielding
information to the infant with the first eye movements. This exploratory perceptual
behavior is adaptive behavior that provides information about the environment prior to
performance (E. J. Gibson, 1969). Therefore, children spend most of their time exploring
their environment in order to understand it. The active nature of this process is concisely
communicated in Gibson's expression "perceiver as performer" (E. J. Gibson, 1969).
Gibson describes perception as becoming increasingly specific, or, to use her
terminology, undifferentiated perception becomes differentiated perception. Children
continuously perceive various arrays in the environment, and with this increasing
experience, they become better able to differentiate the information contained in the
stimuli. Thus the child's perceptual abilities improve with experience. For example, as
children have more experience in listening to an orchestra, they become better able to
pick out specific instruments. In a similar way, as children learn to read, they become
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better able to extract the essential features which differentiate letters and words.
Perception becomes more exact in that there is an increasingly correct correspondence
between what the child perceives and the information contained in the stimulus or
perceptual array.
Gibson (1969) also proposes that attention becomes more active and selective
with development. Attention is defined as the activities that gather information about the
environment. Throughout development, children's perceptions become increasingly
selective as children learn to adaptperception to situational and task requirements.
Perception is guided by goals and needs specific to each task or situation.
Perception of Integral and Separable Stimuli
The Gibsons and their followers have focused on the rich information, or
properties, of the optic array, that are available to the perceiver. While the Gibsons have
disavowed cognitive models ofperceptual processing, other theorists have borrowed
some of the Gibson's insights and have reformulated them in information processing
approaches to perception. Perceptual psychologists, such as Garner (1974; Garner &
Felfoldy, 1970), have emphasized that the perception of"stimulus structure" can be
constrained by specific combinations of the physical attributes of the stimulus. Although
Garner emphasizes stimulus structure, he recognizes that structure cannot be completely
specified independent of the perceiver. In his review ofthe perception literature, Garner
(1974) concludes that adults use different psychological mechanisms to process stimuli
which, as he designates them, contain integral and separable attributes. Processing of
.10
integral stimuli, such as those composed ofhue and brightness, prompt a comparison
process which is determined by the overall similarity ofholistic units in the stimulus
space. In contrast, when stimuli have separable attributes, such as those composed of
circle size and the angle of a radial line inside the circle, specific dimensional relations
are primary in perceptual comparison (Callaghan, 1992). Although both the holistic
structure and the dimensional structure are available for processing in all stimuli, the
primary structure used in processing is dependent on the specific attribute combinations
available in the stimulus structure itself (Garner, 1974).
In free classification tasks, adults sort integral stimuli to maximize the overall
similarity ofmembers within a group, whereas separable stimuli are sorted to preserve a
dimensional identity within the group (Garner, 1974; Kemler & Smith, 1979). The
integral dimensions of an object are not perceived dimensionally but holistically and
constitute one perceptual whole. For example, the dimensions ofhue and brightness are
highly integral and classification on either dimension is difficult even for experts in color
analysis (Burns & Shepp, 1988). In comparison, separable dimensions maintain their
perceptual independence when combined (Smith, 1989). For example, when sorting
squares of different size and color, adults have no difficulty in placing all the red squares
together during one sort and switching to place all the small squares together on the next
sort (Burns, 1992). Adults, however, are able to access either the holistic or featural
properties in many sets ofmultidimensional objects, and may select the properties which
most f~cilitates execution of the task at hand (Shepp, 1989).
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In addition to stimulus structure itself, the developmental level of the perceiver
has also been found to limit the accessing ofdimensional structure (Callaghan, 1992).
Because perceptions of children under the age of six years have been found to be
dominated by the global or holistic properties ofobjects, children's perception of
multidimensional stimulus structure has been the subject ofmuch work in cognitive
development (Burns, 1992; Burns & Shepp, 1988; Gibson, 1969; Kemler, 1983; Kemler
& Smith, 1979; Shepp, 1989; Shepp & Swartz, 1976; Smith, 1989; Smith & Heise, 1992;
Smith & Kemler, 1977). In these experiments, preschoolers (4 to 5 years of age), and
elementary school children (6 to 11 years of age) were presented with stimuli composed
of either integral or separable dimensions and were asked to perform a classification task,
such as putting together those members of a triad which go together best. In these tasks,
both younger children and older children were more likely to classify stimuli with
integral dimensions on the basisoftheir overall similarity. In contrast, only older children
change strategies and classify the separable stimuli on the basis oftheir dimensional
identity (Burns, 1992; Burns & Shepp, 1988; Inhelder & Piaget, 1964; Kemler, 1983;
Shepp, 1989; Shepp, Burns & McDonough, 1980; Smith, 1989).
Although the evidence for holistic processing in young children is compelling,
there is data to suggest that even young children are capable of accessing the dimensional
structure of multidimensional stimuli under certain task demands (Smith & Kemler,
1977; Smith, 1989). Smith and Kemler (1977) have found that young children are able to
access the dimensional structure if the task demands are highly analytical. In order to
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promote more thoughtful classifying, they utilized tetrads, rather than triads with young
elementary school children (kindergarten, second and fifth grade). The children were
asked to separate the four stimulus cards into two groups, specifically the experimenter
stated, " ... make two groups: put two over here (on one side of a red line) so that they
go together, and put two over here (on the other side) so that they go together." (Smith &
Kemler, 1977, p. 209). The children were then asked to regroup these same stimuli. Next
they were asked to justify both the first and the second classification. These tasks were
not timed. As expected, Smith and Kemler (1977) found an increase in dimensional
responding with age. Interestingly, they also found that, although holistic classifying was
primary at the youngest age, even these children were able to access and verbalize
information about the dimensional structure, or the dimensions that compose them. Based
on these findings, Smith and Kemler hypothesized that even young children are able to
analyze the dimensional structure ofmultidimensional stimuli ifnecessary. That is,
children can use what Smith and Kemler consider a more sophisticated form of analytic
processing when the task demands it. Similarly, Smith (1989) argues that even older
preschool children can access the dimensional structure of objects under certain task
conditions. More specifically, she points out that children tend to be more analytic when
there are no time constraints on performance, and when the need to focus attention is
made explicit. Thus, the perceptual representation depends on the integrality of the
dimensional attributes, the age ofthe perceiver, and the demands of the task (Smith,
1991).
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Although the research previously cited has argued that integral and separable
dimensions are processed differently by older and younger children, the tasks utilized
were classification tasks, most often given with task demands which included a time
constraint (Burns & Shepp, 1988; Garner, 1974; Kemler & Smith, 1979; Shepp, 1989;
Shepp, Burns & McDonough, 1980; Smith, 1989). The perception of structure in the
context of an analytic task has not been given much attention in the developmental
literature. One task which requires analytic thinking and which has great importance in
cognitive development is reasoning by analogy.
Theories ofAnalogical Reasoning
Reasoning by analogy is an essential cognitive skill which children must develop
in order to become successful problem solvers. Through the use of analogy the child can
employ previous knowledge and experiences to navigate successfully through novel
· problems and events. This skill is used whenever the child solves a new problem by
· making reference, either consciously or unconsciously, to one solved previously. When
· the child reaches school, the importance of analogy continues and is critical to successful
academic performance. Teachers, especially in science and mathematics, utilize
analogical reasoning to assist the child in acquiring new knowledge. For example, science
teachers frequently use an analogy between the atom and the solar system to explain that
electrons revolve around the nucleus ofthe ~tom. Children draw on what they know
about the solar system to understand this new concept about the atom. Importantly, this
analogy can be drawn and understood even though the solar system and the atom are
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quite dissimilar (Chen, 1996; Gentner, 1988; Goswami, 1992; Holyoak & Barnden,
1994).
When analogies are used as pedagogical aides, the similarity between the critical
relations are pointed out to the learner. However, insightful problem solving often hinges
on noting similarities that are not pointed out by a more knowledgeable other. Cognitive
psychologists interested in how analogies are used in problem solving have argued that
reasoners frequently fail to solve problems because they fail to recognize that problems
which are superficially different sometimes share a similar solution. For example, in the
"radiation problem" (Gick & Holyoak 1980) radiation must be used to destroy a
malignant tumor without damaging the healthy tissue nearby; the solution consists of
using low intensity rays which converge on the tumor from several directions. Most
adults fail to 'invent' this solution even after reading an analogous problem about a
general who captures a fortress by splitting his army into smaller patrols which converge
on the fortress from many sides. Without an explicit hint to use the solution presented in
the fortress problem to solve the radiation problem, only 20% of the subjects suggested
the convergence solution. However, once the similarity in solutions was pointed out, 75%
of subjects suggested using converging rays (Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 1983).
Like problem analogies, classic analogies entail preserving a relationship in the
objects, people, or events being compared. Classic analogies are four term analogies
presented in the form A: B :: C : D. These analogies can be presented verbally or in
writing, for example, hand: glove :: head: _. Classic analogies can also be presented
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in picture form. To correctly solve these analogies, the child needs to discover the higher-
order relation, that is, the relatiol?- between the first pair (A: B) and the second pair (C :
D) ofthe analogy (Goswami, 1989; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Sternberg, 1977b). In the
hand-glove analogy, one higher-order relation might be described as 'covering'.
During the elementary school years, children become more proficient at solving
analogies and, presumably, at uncovering these higher-order relations. Theorists vary in
their accounts of the causes ofthis increased competence. Inhelder and Piaget (1958)
argue that the improvement is due to developmental changes in children's thinking (for a
summary ofPiaget's positions see Gallagher, 1978; Gallagher & Reid, 1981;
Wadsworth, 1979; 1996). In Piaget's view, only fonnal operational thinkers are truly
capable of analogical reasoning. Other researchers have argued that many seemingly
developmental changes in analogical reasoning are merely a function of increases in the
child's knowledge base (Brown, 1989; Gentner, 1983, 1989; Goswami, 1989, 1991,
1992; Goswami & Brown, 1989; Holyoak, Novick & Melz, 1994; Spellman & Holyoak,
1992). Although a few of these theorists (see, for example, Gentner, 1983, 1989) have
taken the extreme view that most, ifnot all, age-related changes reflect the growth of
expertise, most developmental theorists struggle to disentangle the effects of expertise
and developmental change.
Researchers, such as Goswami, have tried to show how inadequacies in the
knowledge base may contribute to the child's failure on many analogical reasoning tasks
(Brown, 1989; Gentner, 1983, 1989; Goswami, 1989, 1991, 1992; Goswami & Brown,
16
1989). Other researchers, such as Sternberg, have tried to develop very specific models of
how analogical reasoning occurs. Sternberg's model of analogical reasoning is an
information processing model "par excellence" (Sternberg, 1977a, 1977b; Sternberg &
Rifkin, 1979). Sternberg's model is essentially a flow chart ofthe steps he believes the
child must go through in order to solve an analogy. Sternberg presents evidence that the
sequence of steps that are used to solve picture analogies vary with the kind of stimuli
that compose the analogy. Sternberg's findings are an interesting extension ofpast work
that has demonstrated that differences in stimulus structure clearly affect performance on
perceptual and attentional tasks (Bums & Shepp, 1988; Gamer, 1974; Kemler & Smith,
1979; Shepp, 1989; Shepp, Bums & McDonough, 1980; Smith, 1989). The purpose of
the present studies was to evaluate Sternberg's claim that differences in stimulus structure
affect how analogies are solved.
Piaget's theory ofanalogical reasoning
Piaget's constructivist theory posits that qualitative changes in logical reasoning
occur with development. Thus the reasoning of the adolescent is considered to be
qualitatively different from that of the child which is, in tum, qualitatively different from
that of the infant. Piaget has argued that the ability to reason by analogy is a late
developing cognitive skill, emerging during the stage of formal operations, at
approximately 10 or 11 years of age (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Wadsworth, 1996).
According to Piaget, analogies involve the formation and construction of relations
between the elements that make up the analogy. Specifically, a lower-order relation
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between the A and B terms must first be constructed; then a higher-order relation, which
allows the lower-order relation between the A and B terms to be applied to the C and D
terms, must be constructed. Piaget argues that the ability to construct a relation between
relations requires logico-mathematical abstraction (Gallagher & Reid, 1981; Wadsworth,
1979; 1996). In Piagetian theory, ·it is only when children reach formal operations that
they are capable of logico-mathematical abstraction and the ability to reason by analogy
is complete (Inhelder& Piaget, 1958; Gallagher, 1978; Gallagher & Reid, 1981;
Wadsworth, 1996).
Piaget's depiction ofhow children become proficient at analogical reasoning is
largely based on an experiment involving a pictorial form ofthe classic analogy task.
Piaget and his colleagues first familiarized children with a number ofpictures (e.g., a car,
a gas pump, a vacuum cleaner, a ship, a dog, dog hair). The experimenters then instructed
the children "to put together pairs ofpictures that go well together" (Gallagher, 1978;
Gallagher & Reid, 1981; Wadsworth, 1996). After the pictures were sorted into pairs, the
experimenters asked the children to put two of the pairs together into a 2 x 2 matrix. The
child was told to include in the foursomes those pairs which "go together well." Thus,
initially, the child had to construct the relations in both pairs of the analogy without input
from the experimenter and then had to uncover a higher-order relation which related the
two pairs. Ifthe children incorrectly constructed the analogy, hints were given; if they
correctly constructed the analogies, incorrect counter-suggestions were posed by the
experimenters. For Piaget and his colleagues, children were fully capable of analogical
..
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reasoning only if they could resist the experimenter's counter-suggestions by knowingly
articulating the higher-order relations in the analogy. Thus, Piaget demands the child be
able to articulate and justify his or her answer before he or she is credited with full
analogical reasoning skills (Gallagher, 1978).
Piaget posits that a succession of abstractions made during the preoperational and
concrete operational stages serve as the prerequisites for analogical reasoning.
Specifically, in the preoperational stage, children show an emerging ability to reason
about relations. Children are able to construct lower-order relations or correlates,
relations between the A and B terms or between the C and D terms (Piaget, 1979). States
or attributes are compared but the basis of the construction ofrelations are quite erratic;
the relations that are noted are not the higher order relations. For example, Piaget reports
a five-year-old's explanation of the analogy "bird: feathers :: dog: hair" in this way "the
dog needs hair to keep warm, the bird needs the feathers to fly" (Gallagher, 1978, p. 10).
At about the age of 7 years, children enter the concrete-operational stage and
become capable ofreasoning consistently about relations; this skill is reflected in their
newfound success on the class inclusion problem. Piaget believed that the ability to
construct classes allows the child to combine simple relations and to examine common
characteristics of the relations, which makes it possible for the child to construct both
lower-order as well as higher-order relations (Gallagher & Reid, 1981; Wadsworth,
1996). Although concrete-operational thinkers sometimes recognize higher-order
relations and construct complete analogies, Piaget reports they frequently had difficulty
1
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resisting counter-suggestions. When the formal operational stage is reached, the child is
fully capable ofconstructing analogies and of resisting an experimenter's counter-
suggesting.
Information Processing Theory
Information processing theory is not a single consolidated theory but rather a
framework used by researchers who focus on the precise steps involved in different
mental endeavors (Miller, 1993; Siegler, 1998). This approach does not use a stage model
to describe qualitative changes in the child's thinking but focuses on the flow of
information through the cognitive system. Information processing theories of
development include a diverse set of approaches encompassing suchareas as the child's
representation of information, the processes the child uses to transform information, and
the child's memory capacity that limits the amount of information he or she can process
or represent (Siegler, 1998). All information processing models share a fundamental
assumption that cognitive processes begin with inputs, usually stimuli into the system,
and end with varied outputs such as physical behavior, language production, or a
complex decision (Miller, 1993).
Information processing theory was first used to model adult cogniti0D:; however,
this work was quickly extended to developmental psychology (see, for example, Klahr &
Wallace, 1976). Developmental theories in the information processing tradition have
frequently stressed the role the knowledge base plays in mediating performance.
Knowledge-based theory. In contrast to Piagetian theory which postulates
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qualitative developmental differences in children's thinking, researchers who ascribe to
the knowledge-based theory of analogical reasoning believe that children are capable of
reasoning by analogy from infancy. These researchers posit that it is not a qualitative
change in children's thinking that results in improvement in the ability to reason by
analogy, but rather a quantitative change in the amount ofknowledge over which the
child has mastery which causes the improvement in analogical reasoning (Brown, 1989;
Carey, 1991; Gentner, 1977, 1988, 1989; Gentner & Ratlermann, 1991; Goswami, 1989,
1991, 1992; Goswami & Brown, 1989; Holyoak, 1984; Holyoak, Novick & Melz, 1994).
Recent research pointing to early competency in analogical reasoning tasks has
provided support for this knowledge-based account of analogical reasoning. For example,
Gos",ami and Brown (1989) found that 3-year-olds were capable of analogical reasoning
when the relations that made up the analogy were understood. These preschoolers were
presented with a pictorial version ofthe analogy "chocolate bar: melted chocolate bar ::
snowman: __". The 3-year-olds were able to correctly complete this analogy by
choosing picture of a puddle ofwater (a melted snowman). Goswami and Brown attribute
this ability to correctly solve the analogy to the 3-year-olds' understanding ofthe causal
relation ofmelting.
The knowledge-based theory of analogical reasoning emphasizes the importance
of, and differences between, relational similarity and relational knowledge. The necessity
ofmaintaining and utilizing the higher-order relations in the solving of analogies has
been referred to as the relational similarity constraint. Relational similarity refers to the
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child's ability to reason about higher-order relations, or the relations between relations, in
order to solve the analogy (Goswami, 1989, 1991, 1992; Goswami & Brown, 1989).
Specifically, the child must equate the relations in the target of the analogy (the 'C' and
'D' terms) with the relations in the base of the analogy (the 'A' and 'B' terms), thus using
the relational similarity constraint (Brown, 1989; Goswami, 1992; Goswami & Brown,
1990). Alternately, relational knowledge or content knowledge refers to the child's
knowledge about how the objects in the analogy are related, that is, the content of the
analogy. According to this account of analogical reasoning ability, the problem for
children is not that they lack the cognitive competence or structures necessary to reason
about higher-order relations, but rather that they do not possess an understanding ofthe
information or content contained in the analogy. Ifchildren apprehend the conceptual
content ofthe analogy, they will be able to solve it. Therefore, children's ability to reason
by analogy improves with age, not because of a change in their thinking, but rather
because of an increase in their knowledge base.
Componential theory of analogical reasoning. Arising from the information
processing tradition, Sternberg (Sternberg, 1977a, 1977b; Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979;
Sternberg & Nigro, 1980) has formulated a componential theory of analogical reasoning
that can be applied to a variety of analogy contents, including verbal, pictorial, and
geometric analogies, as well as to both true-false and forced choice format. In addition,
the model has been applied to children as well as adult reasoners (Sternberg, 1977a,
1977b; Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979; Sternberg & Nigro, 1980).
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The componential theory of analogical reasoning (Sternberg, 1977a, 1977b) posits
several steps which must be executed in order to use analogical reasoning. Initially, the
child must encode the 'A' and 'B' terms in the base analogI and these must be stored in
working memory. In order for the child to perform this step correctly, the child must note
a value for each potentially relevant attribute in the base analog. Then the child uses
inferencing to discover the relations between the 'A' and 'B' terms in the base analog. At
this point, the child would have both attribute values and relational changes stored in
working memory. Sternberg (1977a, 1977b) posits that both encoding and inference are
mandatory steps in the solving of analogies. Once the reasoner is aware ofthe relation
between stimuli in the base analog, the next step is to link the base analog to the target
analog through the use ofmapping. Mapping, as described by Sternberg (1977a, 1977b),
entails uncovering the relation between the 'A' term in the base analog and the 'C' term
in the target analog. This process is hypothesized to be optional. Finally, to correctly
solve the analogy, the child must apply from the 'C' term a relation to the 'D' term which
is identical to the relation inferred in the base analog (the 'A' and 'B' terms) and choose
the appropriate response (Sternberg, 1997a, 1977b; Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979).
Sternberg and Rifkin (1979) were interested in whether the componential
approach could be used to describe children's performance in an analogical reasoning
task. They chose to present children with visual analogies in which specific, well-defmed
attributes changed across the terms of the analogy, for example, the color of the stimulus
might change from the A term to the B term. According to Sternberg and Rifkin, one
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advantage of this type ofpicture analogy is that it allows the researcher to neutralize the
effects of developmental differences in the knowledge base. However, developmental
differences in how the stimuli are perceived, and, more specifically, differences in
whether the objects are perceived holistically or analytically, can also affect performance.
Sternberg and Rifkin presented children with analogies composed ofboth integral and
separable dimensions so that they could systematically examine whether children's
strategies and performance depend on the perceived structure ofthe stimulus.
Solving analogies with integral and separable dimensions. Given the evidence of
a relationship between perception and the specific requirements of cognitive tasks,
Sternberg and Rifkin (1979) proposed that the component processes used to solve an
analogy could be combined in differing ways depending on whether the analogy stimuli
were composed of integral or separable attributes. These differences would be reflected in
latency times for solving of the analogies and would indicate that different models or
strategies were being used.
Although the distinction between integral and separable dimensions is not
independent ofprocessing, Garner (1974) has argued that one fundamental difference
between integral and separable dimensions is that integral attributes cannot be nullified
whereas separable attributes can be nullified. Drawing on this distinction, Sternberg and
Rifkin used attributes of"People Pieces" as their integral dimensions. With these stimuli,
in order to depict one attribute, the other one also had to be present (e.g., a person cannot
be drawn with a height and no weight). "Schematic-clown" figures were used as a
contrasting set of separable stimuli. These consisted of figures whose features could be
added or subtracted without aff~cting the other features (e.g., a clown could carry a
briefcase, an umbrella, or nothing at all).
In Sternberg and Rifkin's (1979) study, children (second, fourth and sixth
graders) were seen for four sessions in a group classroom situation, whereas adults were
seen for one session, also in a large group. Both adults and children were presented with
24 booklets (8 per session for the children) containing either all integral or all separable
analogies. Each booklet contained 16 analogies which were homogenous in the numbers
of attribute value changes from A to B, A to C, and 1 to 2 in the answer options. The
participants were given 64 sec to complete each booklet. Latency time was defined as 64
(the number of seconds given to complete a booklet) divided by the number of items
correctly completed. Latency differences across booklets suggested that children used
different models or strategies which consisted of different combinations of component
processes to solve analogies consisting of integral and separable stimuli.
The models found by Sternberg and Rifkin to be the most feasible for use with the
integral stimuli contain several converging predictions. Specifically, for the integral
stimuli, all models:
predict increases in latencies as the number of attribute values changed from A to
B increases. Such increases were obtained. The models also predict increases in
latencies as the number of attribute values changed from A to C increases. Such
latency increases were obtained at all grade levels except grade 2, where there was
no systematic effects ofA to C changes (p. 215).
In comparison to the predictions for the integral stimulus set, the models found by
Sternberg and Rifkin to be the most feasible for use with the separable stimuli contained
somewhat different converging predictions. Specifically, for the separable stimuli, all
models:
predict that latencies should increase with increasing numbers of attribute values
changed from A to B. This increase in latency should result from the increase in
inference time required to process successfully more transformations between the
first two analogy terms. The data show that latencies indeed were generally
increasing across numbers ofvalue changes ... Second, the models predict that
there should be no increase in latency across A to C transformations (independent
ofA to B increases), since the modified models for separable stimuli do not posit
incremental mapping time ... across A to C transformations, there were no .
significant increases (independent ofA to B increases) (pp. 212-213).
The comparatively low error rates in Sternberg and Rifkin's (1979) experiments
suggested that children as young as second grade can access the dimensional structure of
both integral and separable stimuli within the context of an analogy task, but that young
children process integral and separable stimuli differently. Although Sternberg and Rifkin
used some very specific models to describe these differences, it is not clear if their data is
exacting enough to allow a clear distinction between these models. Sternberg and
Rifkin's latency measure included processing times for the incorrectly solved analogies
plus the correctly solved analogies. It is also not clear how the time constraint of 64
seconds per booklet of 16 analogies may have affected their results. In other tasks, time
constraints encourage holistic processing (Smith & Kemler, 1977). In addition,
administering the analogical reasoning task simultaneously to a large group of children
did not ensure that each of the children understood the task. The imprecise dependent
measure, the time constraint, together with the method of administration of the task allow
much room for errors in the data.
The purpose of the present experiments was to evaluate Sternberg's claim that
differences in stimulus structure affect how analogies are solved. Specifically, I examined
how differences in the number of attribute value changes from the A to the B term as well
as the number of attribute value changes from the A to the C term affect reaction times
and accuracy rates for children's solutions of analogies composed of either integral or
separable stimuli.
Experiment 1
Experiment one consisted of a forced choice analogical reasoning task using
integral stimuli. The stimuli were people piece figures whose attributes have been
characterized as integral (Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979). The attributes manipulated include
the height of the person, the weight of the person, the clothing color, the gender, and arm
position. In this experiment, children were presented with an array of five people piece
figures, an A : B stem, a C term and two choices for the D term.
Because young children's perceptions have been characterized as holistic, it is
hypothesized that second grade children will have a more difficult time than the fourth
and sixth grade children in accessing the dimensional structure of these integral stimuli.
Age differences in how easily the dimensional structure can be accessed should be
reflected in response times. More specifically, older children should be able to solve
these analogies faster and more accurately than the younger children.
Each of Sternberg and Rifkin's (1979) models for analogical reasoning with
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integral stimuli contain converging predictions about two of the component processes,
specifically the inference and mapping component. If, as Sternberg and Rifkin (1979)
propose, increases in the number of attribute value changes from the A to the B term
increases inference time, reaction times for solving these analogies should vary with the
number of attribute values that change. More specifically, ifchildren notice the changes
from A to B, then reaction time should increase as the number of attributes that change
from A to B increases from one to two. I expect that all children will note the number of
attribute value changes from the A to B terms, and respond more slowly when two
attribute values change from the A term to the B term. When two values change, the
information processing load increases and this should have a negative effect on
processing speed. I further expect that the second graders will be particularly slow with
two attribute changes because analyzing the integral stimuli will place a heavy burden on
their information processing resources.
If, as Sternberg and Rifkin (1979) propose, increases in the number of attribute
value changes from the A to the C term increases the time necessary to compare the A
and C terms, a process they refer to as mapping, then reaction times should increase as
the number of attribute value changes from the A to C term is changed from one to three.
For children who note the changes between the A and the C terms, reaction times should
increase with the number of attributes that change from A to C. Given Sternberg and
Rifkin's results, I expect developmental differences in the children's comparisons of the
A and C terms. It is predicted that the fourth and sixth children will compare the A and C
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terms but that the second grade children will not. Consequently, only the older children
should be affected by the number of attribute values that change from the A tenn to the C
term.
Method
Participants. Nine second graders, nine fourth graders, and 10 sixth graders
participated in this experiment. All the children attended a suburban, public elementary
school. The mean ages were 8 years 1 month for the second graders, 9 years 11 months
for the fourth graders, and 11 years 10 months for the sixth graders. Although
socioeconomic data was not collected for these children, the school population consists·
primarily ofmiddle class children.2
Stimuli. The stimuli were slides made from drawings ofElementary Science
Study (ESS) People Piece figures, the same stimulus set used by Sternberg & Rifkin
(1979) with one minor alteration: arms were added to the figure. The ESS figures varied
on four attributes: color of clothing (red or blue), height (tall or short), weight (fat or
thin), gender (male or female). For this experiment, an attribute of arm position (arms up
or arms down) was added. Figures were drawn on separate two in. by three in. cards. A
deck of these cards was constructed and laminated for use in a speeded sorting task.
Before the cards were laminated, they were photographed to make a set of
analogy slides. Each slide consisted of five people piece cards that were placed on a black
background. The first three cards, that is the A, B, and C tenns, were placed in a line;
there were no spaces between the cards. The two alternate D tenns were also placed next
to one another on the same line. A half inch space separated the C tenn from the nearest
alternative (see Figure 1).
Two aspects of the analogies varied across the stimulus set, specifically, the
number of attribute values that changed from the A tenn to the B tenn and the number of
attribute values which changed from the A tenn to the C tenn There were four subsets of
analogies within the stimulus set, each subset contained 10 analogies. In the first subset
(B1Cl), one attribute value changed from the A to the B tenn and one attribute value
changed from the A to the C term. See Table 1 for examples from each subset. In the
second subset (B1C3), one attribute value changed from the A to the B tenn and three
attribute values changed from the A to the C term.
In the third subset (B2Cl), two attribute values changed from the A to the B tenn and one
attribute value changed from the A to the C tenn. In the fourth subset (B2C3), two
attribute values changed from the A to the B term and three attribute values changed from
the A to the C tenn. Attribute value changes were balanced throughout the set so that
there was an equal number of changes for each ofthe five attributes within each ofthe
four subsets. The attribute that varied across the two alternate D tenns was also
counterbalanced. The correct answer appeared equally often on the left and right side.
Apparatus. Stimuli slides were presented using a Gerbrands projection
tachistoscope equipped with two random access projectors. Each slide was shown on a
rear projection screen that was built into a response box. Two pushbuttons were mounted
on the response panel and were connected to a Gerbrands electronic timer.
Procedure. The children were each seen individually for two sessions,
approximately one week apart. In the first session, the children were familiarized with the
stimuli. Specifically, they were shown exactly how the five attributes could vary using a
picture board on which each individual figure was mounted. The child was then
instructed to perform a speeded sorting task. In this task, the child was instructed to sort
the deck ofcards which contained a picture of each people piece figure in the stimulus
set. The child was instructed to sort the cards on the basis of its value on a particular
attribute as quickly as possible (e.g., sort all the red ones in one pile, all the blue ones in
another pile.). The deck was then reshuffled and the child was instructed to sort the deck
by its value on a different attribute (e.g., now put all the tall ones in one pile, all the short
ones in another pile) until the child sorted the deck on the basis of each attribute. Each
child sorted the attributes in a different random order.
After the children completed the sorting task, the analogical reasoning task was
introduced using an analogy constructed from the people piece stimuli mounted on a
rectangular board. The investigator instructed the child to "choose one ofthe two pictures
on the far right that is the same as and different from the third picture (the C term) in the
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same ways that the second picture (the B term) is the same as and different from the first
picture (the A term)." The children were then instructed to use the five attributes they had
learned about as the basis for making their decisions. Three more practice analogies using
the cards were then administered. If the child chose an incorrect answer, the correct
answer was indicated, and the child was told that the correct answer is preferred because
it is "the same as and different from the third picture (the C term) in the same ways that
the second picture (the B term) is the same as and different from the first picture (the A
term)." They were then shown a sample analogy on the tachistoscope. The experimenter
explained how to use the response buttons. A fixation point was presented for 500 msec
before each analogy and the children were told to use this as a guide as to where to the
first term (the A term) of the analogy would appear. Sixteen practice analogies were then
administered, four from each of the four subsets, BICI, BIC3, B2CI, B2C3. The
analogies were presented in a different random order for each child.
In the second session, approximately one week later, the children were again
shown the large picture board with each figure from the stimulus set. They were
reminded of the procedure for solving analogies as delineated above. Forty analogies,. 10
from the BICI subset, 10 from the BIC3 subset, 10 from the B2CI subset, 10 from the
B2C3 subset were then presented to the child, one at a time, using the tachistoscope.
(Individual analogies from each subset were not blocked together but were completely
intermixed.) Children were instructed to respond as soon as they knew what the answer
was. The analogy remained on the screen until the child pressed the response button. The
40 analogies were presented in a different random order for each child.
Results and Discussion
The first session was a practice session to familiarize the children with the stimuli
and the analogical reasoning task, therefore, only the response times (RTs) for the
analogical reasoning task from the second session were analyzed. Th~ dependent measure
consisted ofmedian RTs for the correctly solved analogies which had been presented to
the child.
It was predicted that older children would be able to solve these analogies faster
and more accurately than the younger children because dimensional structure can be
accessed more readily by older children. Surprisingly, there was no age effect and age did
not interact with any other factor. Although response times followed the expected pattern
(second graders' M = 8.06 sec, fourth graders' M =6.56 sec, sixth graders' M =5.15
sec), no statistically significant effects emerged in pair-wise comparisons. It was also
predicted that if children note the attribute value changes as they solve these analogies,
reaction times would vary with the number of attribute values that changed. Specifically,
reaction time should increase as the number of attributes that change from A to B
increases. A three-way 3 x 2 x 2 (age x A-B change x A-C change) mixed design
ANaVA revealed a main effect for inference, F(2, 25) = 19.19,11 < .05. The results show
that reaction times are slower when the children have to infer two attribute value changes
from the A term to the B term (M =5.9 sec when one attribute value changed from the A
to the B term, and M =7.19 sec when two attributes changed). However, there was no
significant age by A-B change interaction. With respect to mapping, it was predicted that
for the fourth and sixth grade children, but not the second grade children, reaction times
would increase with the number of attribute values that changed from A to C. Contrary to
expectation, there were no statistically significant effects for A-C changes, nor were there
any significant interactions. These findings do not support Sternberg and Rifkin's
contention that A-C attribute value changes affect older children's solution times for
these analogies.
In the present experiment, children's accuracy rates were well above chance, M =
86.3%, and this overall accuracy rate is comparable to Sternberg and Rifkin's (1979)
accuracy rate of 89%. Accuracy data were analyzed using a 3 x 2 x 2 (age x A-B change
x A-C change) mixed ANOVA. Results revealed a main effect for inference, F (1,25) =
6.07,12< .05. Specifically, all children were more accurate when one attribute value
changed from the A term to the B term eM = 89.47%) than when two attribute values
changed from the A term to the B term eM = 83.4%). This fmding parallels the findings
for the RTs suggesting there was no speed accuracy tradeoff. No main effects for age or
A-C changes emerged in the accuracy data; and there were no significant interactions.
Results from Experiment 1, specifically the significant main effect for A-B
changes, which was evident in both the RT and the accuracy data, suggest that children
use an analytic inference process to solve these integral analogies and this process takes
longer as the number of attribute values that change from the A to the B term increases.
In contrast, because there was no significant effect for A-C changes, either mapping was
not used with these stimuli, the time it took to perform the mapping was trivial, or
mapping was consistently applied without any connection to the number of attribute
values which changed from the A term to the C term. Although the analogies in
Experiment 1 were composed of integral stimuli, even the second graders were able to
access the dimensional structure ofthe stimuli to complete the analogies correctly.
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Experiment 2
Experiment 2 consisted of a forced choice analogical reasoning task using
schematic clown figures whose attributes have been characterized as separable (Sternberg
& Rifkin, 1979). In this experiment, as in Experiment 1, children were presented with an
array of five pictures, an A : B stem, a C term and two choices for the D term. The
attributes manipulated include the pattern on the figure's suit, the footwear, hand gear,
hat color, and type oftoy.
Because young children's perceptions have been characterized as holistic, it is
hypothesized that the second grade children will have a difficult time accessing the
dimensional structure of these separable stimuli which should be reflected in either high
error rates or longer RTs. Although in some contexts, second graders base their
judgments on a global, holistic impression of the stimuli, given that the second graders in
Experiment 1 were able to analyze the integral stimuli into their constituent attributes and
use those attributes to solve analogies, I expect that second graders will have little
difficulty analyzing the separable stimuli.
Although I expect that younger and older children will be able to access the
dimensional structure of separable stimuli, it may be easier for older children to do so.
Age differences it?- the ability to access dimensional structure and to handle the number of
attribute changes should be reflected in response times. Specifically, the sixth grade
children should be able to solve these analogies faster and more accurately than the fourth
and second grade children. If, as Sternberg and Rifkin (1979) propose, inference time is
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related to time necessary to process changes between the first two analogy terms, solution
time should increase as the number of attribute values changed from A to B increases.
More specifically, if the children notice the attribute value changes from A to B, then
reaction time should increase as the number of attribute values that change from A to B
increases. I expect that second grade children will be especially slow when two attributes
change from the A term to the B term because they will take longer to aceess the
dimensional structure and because they will have a harder time handling the infonnation
processing load.
Sternberg and Rifkin found no increase in incremental mapping time with
separable stimuli; in their study there was no increase in processing time as attribute
value changes increased from A to C. Given these findings, I expect that the none of the
children in the present study will compare the A and C tenns. Consequently, the
children's reaction times will not be affected by the number of attributes that change from
the A to the C tenn. Because oftheir greater experience with analogical reasoning tasks
and greater memory capacity, I predict that the sixth graders will be the most accurate of
the three age groups with the stimuli with separable attributes. Further, the higher the
number of attribute value changes which the child has to process, the slower the reaction
time and the lower the accuracy for all age groups.
Method
Participants. Ten second graders, mean age 7 years 11 months, eight fourth graders,
mean age 9 years 9 months, and 11 sixth graders, mean age 11 years 11 months
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participated in this experiment. All the children attended a suburban, public elementary
school. Although socioeconomic data was not collected for these children, the school
population consists primarily ofmiddle class children.
Stimuli. The stimuli were slides of schematic-clown figures, the same stimulus set
used by Sternberg & Rifkin (1979) with one minor change, a fifth attribute was added.
The stimuli used by Sternberg and Rifkin varied on four attributes: pattern on suit (stripes
or dots), footwear (shoes or boots), hand gear (briefcase or umbrella), hat color (white or
black). For this experiment, a fifth attribute consisting of a toy (kite or balloon) held in
the figure's hand was added. As with the people piece figures, the schematic-clown
figures were drawn on separate 2 in. by 3 in. cards and a deck of cards and sets of slides
were constructed. See Experiment 1 for details and Figure 2 for an example of a
schematic-clown analogy.
Apparatus. The apparatus used in this experiment was the same one described
above in Experiment 1.
Procedure. The procedure used in this experiment was the same as that described
in Experiment 1. The only difference being that in this experiment the schematic-clown
stimulus set was used in the experimental tasks.
Results and Discussion
As in Experiment 1, the first session was a practice session to familiarize the
children with the stimuli and the analogical reasoning task, therefore, only the RTs for
the analogical reasoning task from the second session were analyzed. The dependent
.,~ -,- .-,.• , -'.._,,-~~
.~,:::-"':.,:, .. ::-<::.;::_::-:::-,,,;-:: '
.....
,~-:.:~ ;.,.~.,--_ "'.:..::;.c::,:,."'~'.5
-measure consisted ofmedian RTs for the correctly solved analogies.
It was predicted that older children would be able to solve these analogies faster
and more accurately than the younger children because dimensional structure can be
accessed more readily by older children. A two-way 3 x 2 x 2 (age x A-B change x A-C
change) mixed design analysis ofvariance revealed a main effect for age, E(2,26) =3.63,
11 < .05. As predicted, the mean RT for the sixth grade was the quickest at 8.15 sec,
slower for the fourth grade at 10.07 sec, and slowest for the second grade at 11.75 sec. It
was also predicted that reaction times would increase as the number of attribute value
changes increased. Contrary to these predictions, there were no statistically significant
effects for A-B changes, A-C changes, nor was there a significant interaction.
In the present experiment, children's accuracy rates were well above chance, M =
80.6%. Accuracy data were analyzed using a 3 x 2 x 2 (age x A-B change x A-C changes)
mixed ANOVA. Results demonstrated no effect for age; all children were equally able to
complete the analogies correctly. Results from the accuracy data revealed no effect for A-
B changes, A-C changes, nor any interaction. These findings argue against a speed
accuracy tradeoff.
Results from Experiment 2 suggest that although the children become quicker at
solving these analogies with separable stimuli as they get older, there is no diminution in
their accuracy. As evidenced by their success in solving the analogies, each age group
was able to access the dimensional structure of the schematic clown figures. However,
the results from Experiment 2 suggest that neither increases in A-B attribute value
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changes nor A-C attribute value changes affected reaction times for the children's solving
of these separable analogies. Given that A-B attribute value changes affect processing
times in all ofSternberg's models, Sternberg's steps do not appear to capture how
children solve these analogies.
One possible strategythat Sternberg does not consider is that children may scan
across the figure array, attending to a single attribute. This strategy seems reminiscent of
Vurpillot and Moal's (1970) finding that older children (over pre-school age)
systematically scan pairs ofpictures with multiple attributes. Vurpillot and Moal (1970)
found that children over 5 years of age systematically scan attributes searching for
identical attributes in the figural array when trying to determine whether figures were the
same or different. The children in the present study may have adopted a similar strategy
in solving a subset of the schematic clown analogies. In 15 ofthe analogies, one
dimension maintained a constant value across the A, B, and C terms, and therefore that
value had to remain constant in the correct answer. Thus a correct answer could be
chosen by attending to that single attribute which maintained a constant value across the
figure array and eliminating the choice in which that specific attribute was different. For
example, in Figure 2, the clown in the A term was wearing a striped suit, as were the
clowns in the B and C term, therefore the answer choice wearing a dotted suit could be
quickly eliminated. The 15 analogies which could be solved using this strategy were
labeled constant-value analogies and all 25 other analogies which could not be solved
using this strategy were labeled varying-value analogies. A 3 x 2 (age x analogy type)
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mixed ANOYA was performed. No significant main effects or interactions were revealed
by this analysis.
Additionally, in eight ofthe analogies, an answer could be chosen quickly
because the value of a particular attribute occurred on every other clown in the analogy
stem and the C term. For example the clown in the A term was wearing dots, the clown in
the B term was wearing stripes, the clown in the C term was wearing dots, one of the
answer choices was wearing stripes, the other answer choice was wearing dots. Thus, the
child .could choose the correct answer by quickly scanning the figures and completing the
alternating pattern for that particular attribute. These eight analogies were grouped
together and named alternating analogies, the remaining 32 analogies were non-
alternating analogies. No main effects or interactions were revealed by this 3 x 2 (age x
analogy type) ANDYA. Although all age groups were able to solve these separable
analogies, there is no evidence that they consistently applied a specific strategy to
determine the correct answer.
General Discussion
The present experiments replicate Sternberg's finding that children are capable of
solving classical A : B :: C : D analogies with perceptual stimuli. Several aspects ofthe
task may have contributed to the children's high accuracy rates. All of the attribute values
of each stimulus set were attributes with which the children were familiar, i.e. colors,
patterns, toys, height. In addition, all the attribute values were clearly communicated to
the children, and the children had experience sorting by each dimension before they
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performed the analogical reasoning task. The requirements ofthe analogical reasoning
task were also explicitly explained to the children in detail. Thus, the conditions created
in these experiments were precisely those which have been found by other researchers to
foster analytic processing in classification tasks (Smith, 1989; Smith & Kemler, 1977;
Smith & Katz, 1996). These same conditions may have fostered the children's ability to
reason by analogy.
In the context of this highly analytic task, even the youngest children were
capable of accessing the dimensional structure of integral and separable stimuli.
However, as can be seen from the pattern ofreaction times, the perceived structure ofthe
stimuli affected performance. Children's response times for solving analogies containing
the integral (people piece) stimuli was much quicker than their response times for solving
analogies containing the separable (schematic clown) stimuli. (The overall mean with the
integral stimuli was 6.59 sec compared to 9.99 sec for the separable stimuli). In contrast,
although Sternberg and Rifkin found differences in latency patterns across booklets, they
found no overall differences in latency times for the people piece and the schematic
clown analogies. The dependent measure used in the present experiments was the actual
processing time for each analogy correctly solved whereas Sternberg and Rifkin's latency
measure included processing times for the incorrectly solved analogies plus the correctly
solved analogies. (Their measure was the 64 seconds children were given to work in each
booklet divided by the number of correctly solved analogies.) The dependent measure
used in the present experiments is a more precise measure of actual response time. The
increased speed of response time for the integral stimuli was not associated with any
decrease in accuracy rates, therefore the increased speed could not be attributed to a
speed - accuracy tradeoff in solving the people piece analogies.
The integral nature of the people piece stimuli did not interfere with the children's
ability to perform this analytic task, indeed, the integrality of the stimuli fostered faster
response time. Perhaps the integral nature of the people piece stimuli helped created a
perceptual whole, giving each figure an individual identity which the children were then
able to utilize for a more rapid comparison of attributes than was possible with the
schematic clowns.
Although children were able to solve analogies with both the integral and
separable stimuli, results from the present experiments point out that differences in the
stimulus structure affects the processes used in solving the analogies. When solving
analogies with integral stimuli, the children were affected by the number of attribute
changes from the A term to the B term but not by the number of attribute changes from
the A term to the C term. In contrast, when solving analogies with separable attributes,
neither the number of attribute changes from the A term to the B term nor the number of
attribute changes from the A term to the C term had any systematic effects. Children did
not consistently focus.on which attributes changed or which attributes remained constant
across the analogy.
Because for each age group the RTs for solving the analogies with integral stimuli
varied as a function of the number of attributes which had to be inferred, inference, or
)
42
noticing which attributes change across the first two terms, seems to be an important step
children use to solve these an~logies. The perceptual nature of the people piece stimuli
promotes the processing of each figure as an integrated whole. This holistic processing,
which results in each figure possessing an individual identity (e.g., the tall, blue, thin man
with arms up) may have decreased the information processing load. This reduction in the
encoding demands ofthe task may have made it easier for children to perform the
attribute comparisons that are required for inferencing. In contrast, the separable
schematic clown figures do not have an individual identity, the shape of each figure is the
same, the attributes are peripheral to their identity and each attribute had to be
remember~d separately (Le., wearing a striped suit, carrying an umbrella, wearing a white
hat, wearing boots, holding a balloon) which increased the information processing load.
When examining the schematic-clown stimuli, it becomes immediately apparent that each
figure is composed ofmany attributes and, intuitively, keeping track of them seems
daunting even for adults. Therefore, the children may have opted to encode one attribute
at a time and check its value across all the terms in the analogy. Subsequent analyses I
performed, however, suggested that children did not do this in any systematic way.
Children did not look for constant values, alternating values, nor did they have any
consistent order in which they checked attribute values. It would seem that children did
not use a single coherent strategy or process in solving the separable analogies. The
figures are complex with different attributes and the children might have been unable to
construct a consistent strategy but rather may simply have adopted a haphazard checking
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of attributes depending on which attribute in a particular figure array was the most salient
to them. Although the exact processes used by the children in solving the analogies with
separable stimuli could not be detennined in the present experiment, it is clear from the
high accuracy rates that the children had the ability to solve this type of analogy
correctly.
The results from these experiments further suggest that noting the number of
attribute changes from the A tenn to the C tenn, or mapping as Sternberg and Rifkin
define it, is not a systematically used process in solving analogies with perceptual
stimuli. Sternberg and Rifkin (1979) found evidence ofmapping by older children and
adults when solving the analogies with integral but not separable stimuli. They then
postulated that the inability to map reflected younger children's inability to construct
higher order relations. However, Sternberg and Rifkin defined mapping as the ability to
note the changes from the A tenn to the C tenn. This process is not the same as
constructing a higher-order relation. Other researchers define mapping as the use ofthe
relational similarity constraint (Goswami, 1992; Goswami & Brown, 1989). In order for
the children to correctly complete the analogies in the present experiments, they had to
note the attribute change from the A to the B tenn and then apply the same relation from
the C to the D tenn. If they had been unable to do this, their accuracy rates would have
been lower than was found in the present experiments. Thus, the children were able to
apply the relational similarity constraint and utilize this higher order relation. So, under
Goswami's (1992) definition, all age groups, including second graders, used mapping
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with both the integral and separable stimuli.
The task children were presented with in these experiments is v~ry different from
that ofPiaget. Before Piaget was willing to credit children with analogical reasoning
skill, he required the children to construct the relations between objects, not merely to
discover a lower-order relation already existing in the base analogy presented to the child.
Piaget and his colleagues did not explain the specific requirements ofthe task to the
child, rather instructing the children to put together those objects which go together well.
To successfully complete Piaget's analogies, the children had to discover the system of
relations in the base and apply them to the target. Thus, it is not surprising that accuracy
rates for the present experiment would be higher than those found by Piaget and others
whose tasks required different skills. The present task also should be distinguished from
verbal analogies, in which the higher-order relation is not perceptually present but rather
has to be discovered through reasoning, and as Goswami's work suggests, success in
verbal analogies depends heavily on a strong knowledge base.
When the present findings are considered in the context ofprior studies with
integral and separable stimuli, it is clear that an interactive model of task performance is
needed. No one factor can be singled out as the sole determinant ofperformance. Rather,
performance must be considered to be the result of the interaction between the cognitive
and perceptual abilities of the reasoner, the reasoning task itself, and the materials used in
the task. Brown (1982) has discussed the interactive nature of the learning process and
her model can be extended to differences in performance that have been found with
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integral and separable stimuli (see Figure 4). In Brown's model, the perceptions of('
reasoners are dependent on the physical structure of the material, the level ofmaturity of
the perceptual system and cognitive structures, and the task in which the reasoner is
engaged. The various aspects oftask performance interact with each other in one-way,
two-way, three-way, and even four-way interactions.
In particular, although perceived dimensional structure fosters specific types of
processing, it is not the only determinant of task performance. The nature and demands of
the task also guide performance. Although the age ofthe child must be taken into account
when predicting task performance, in the present study, performance did not vary across
the age range I tested. Age differences might have emerged ifyounger children were
included in the study. Alternatively, differences in children's preferred mode of
perceptual processing, that is, holistic or analytic, may not have mattered in this
particular task. In the present experiments it was shown that even the second graders
could access the dimensional structure of the integral people piece figures. Indeed, rather
than hampering these young subjects' performance, as may be inferred from earlier
findings with classification tasks, the integral structure ofthe stimuli may have actually
facilitated children's performance in the analogical reasoning task. With integral stimuli,
all age groups tend to prefer holistic processing and holistic processing may have made it
possible to encode each term of the analogy as a particular person with a unique identity
which may have made it easier to compare specific features (Gentner & Lowenstein,
1999; Kuczaj, 1999).11 would seem that with integral stimuli, the interaction of the
...
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child's preferred mode ofperceptual processing, the demands of the reasoning task, and
the dimensional structure of the stimuli used in the task int.eracted in a way which
fostered correct performance.
The interaction between these factors cannot be overemphasized, and should be
stressed more in academic situations. Understanding a task with one set ofmaterials does
not necessarily mean that the same task will be understood with different materials.
Different materials place different processing demands on the perceiver and the
perceptual demands of the task need to be considered before a child is judged to be
capable or incapable ofperforming a particular task. Therefore, educators and researchers
should consider each aspect of the academic. or experimental situation as well as the way
in which each facet of the situation interacts with the others.
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Table 1
Examples of Subset Stimulus Construction for Integral Stimuli
Subset Attribute A Term BTerm CTerm
BICI Color Blue Red Blue
Height Tall Tall Tall
Weight Fat Fat Fat
Gender Male Male Male
Arms Down Down Up
BIC3 Color Blue Blue Blue
Height Tall Tall Short
Weight Fat Thin Fat
Gender Male Male Female
Arms Down Down Up
B2CI Color Red Red Red
Height Short Tall Short
Weight Thin Thin Thin
Gender Female Female Male
Arms Down Up Down
B2C3 Color Red Red Blue
Height Tall Tall Short
Weight Thin Thin Fat
Gender Female Male Female
Arms Down Up Down
Table 2
Mean Reaction Times (sec) for Solution ofIntegral Analogies by Stimulus Type
Grade
Second Grade
Fourth Grade
Sixth Grade
B1C1
6.86
5.90
4.89
B1C3
7.10
7.76
5.03
B2C1
9.60
7.46
5.17
B2C3
8.68
7.06
5.52
Table 3
Mean Reaction Times (sec)for Solution of Separable Analogies by Stimulus Type
Grade
Second Grade
Fourth Grade
Sixth Grade
BICI
11.82
10.73
8.25
BIC3
10.99
9.73
7.80
50
B2Cl
11.76
9.80
8.18
B2C3
12.43
10.03
8.37
5 J
52
V1
'..-1
Figure 3 Example of a constant-value analogy using schematic clown
stimuli from Experiment 2
Figure 4. Amodel ofthe interactive nature oftask performance, stimulus structure,
characteristics ofperformer, and performance activities. This figure shows how
Brown's tetrahedral model can be used to conceptualize the interactive nature of
performance by considering the developmental level ofthe performer, the task
activities required, the nature ofthe task itself and the types of materials used in the
task.
Characteristics of the learner
• Age
• Perceptual skills
• Knowledge
• Task understanding
• Experience
Performance activities
• Analysis
• Comparisons
• Attention
• Encoding
• Decision making
Tasks
• Speeded Classification
• Unspeeded Classification
• Speeded Perceptual Matching
• Analogical Reasoning
Nature of the materials
• Physical structure
• Integrality
• Separability
• Psychological structure
• Modality
References
Banks, W. P., & Krajicek, D. (1991). Perception. Annual Review ofPsychology.
~305-331.
Barrett, S. E. & Shepp, B. E. (1988). Developmental changes in attentional skills:
The effect of irrelevant variations on encoding and response. Journal of Experimental
Child Psychology. 45. 382-399.
Brown, A. L. (1989). Analogical learning and transfer: What develops? In S.
Vosniadou & A. Ortony (Eds.) Similarity and analogical reasoning (pp. 369-412). New
York: Cambridge.
Brown, A. L. (1990). Domain-specific principles affect learning and transfer in
children. Cognitive Science. 14, 107-133.
Brown, A. L. (1982). Learning and development: The problems of compatibility,
access and induction. Human Development. 25.89-115.
Burns, B. (1992). Perceived similarity in perceptual and conceptual development:
The influence of category information on perceptual organization. In B. Burns (Ed.),
Percepts. concepts and categories the representation and processing of information. (pp.
176-231). NY: North Holland
Callaghan, T. C. (1992). Structure in the process of seeing. In B. Burns (Ed.),
Perc\Wts. concepts and categories the representation and processing of information, (pp.
233-272). NY: North Holland.
Chen, Z. (1996). Children's analogical problem solving: The effects of
superficial, structural, and procedural similarity. Journal ofExperimental Child
Psychology. 62. 410-431.
Gallagher,1. M. (1978). Reflexive abstraction and education. In 1. M. Gallagher
& 1. A. Easley, Jr. (Eds.), Knowledge and development volume 2: Piaget and education.
(pp. 1-20) New York: Plenum Press.
Gallagher, 1. M. & Reid, D. K. (1981) The learning theory ofPiaget and Inhelder.
Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Garner, W. R. & Felfoldy, G. L. (1970). Integrality of stimulus dimensions in
perceptual information processing. Cognitive Psychology. 1.225-241.
Garner, W. R. (1974). The processing of information and structure. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum
Gentner, D. (1977).Children's performance on simple spatial analogy task. Child
Development. 48. 1034-1039.
Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy.
Cognitive Science. 7. 155-170.
Gentner, D. (1988). Metaphor as structure-mapping: The relational shift. Child
Development. 59.47-59.
Gentner, D. (1989).The mechanisms of analogical learning. In S. Vosniadou & A.
Ortony (Eds.) Similarity and analogical reasoning (pp. 199-241). New York: Cambridge.
Gentner, D., & Holyoak, K. 1. (1997). Reasoning and learning by analogy.
American Psychologist. 52. 1,32-34.
56
'--_ .._---_._---~ ..__.~---- .....-.-._-_.
Gentner, D., & Loewenstein, J. (1999). Making Comparisons Leads to Relational
Insight. Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Research in Child
Development, Albuquerque, NM.
Gentner, D., & Rattermann, M. J. (1991). Language and the career of similarity.
In S.A. Gelman & J. P. Byrnes (Eds.), Perspectives in thought and language:
Interrelations in development (pp. 225-277). New York: Cambridge.
Gibson, E. J. (1969). Principles ofperceptual learning and development. NY:
Academic Press.
Gibson, E. J. (1991). Perceptual development from the ecological approach. In E.
J. Gibson (Ed.), An odyssey in learning and perception. (pp. 499-501). Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Gibson, E. J. & Gibson, J. J. (1991). The senses as information-seeking
systems. In E. J. Gibson (Ed.), An odyssey in learning and perception. (pp. 504-
510). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gibson, J. J. (1960). The concept of the stimulus in psychology. American
Psychologist. 15. 1,694-703.
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.
Gick, M. L., & Holyoak, K. J. (1980). Analogical problem solving. Cognitive
Psychology. 12. 306-335.
Gick, M. L., & Holyoak, K. J. (1983). Schema induction and analogical transfer.
57
Cognitive Psychology. 15. 1-38.
Goswami, U. (1989). Relational complexity and the development of analogical
reasoning. Cognitive Development. 4. 251-268.
Goswami, U. (1991). Analogical reasoning: What develops? A review of research
and theory. Child Development. 62. 1-22.
Goswami, U. (1992). Analogical reasoning in children. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Goswami, u., & Brown, A. L. (1989). Melting chocolate and melting snowmen:
Analogical reasoning and causal relations. Cognition. 35. 69-95.
Goswami, u., & Brown, A. L. (1990). Higher-order structure and relational
reasoning: Contrasting analogical and thematic relations. Cognition. 36. 207-226.
Gregory, R. (1991). Seeing as thinking: An active theory ofperception. In E. 1.
Gibson (Ed.), An odyssey in learning and perception. (pp. 511-519). Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Holyoak, K. 1. (1984). Analogical thinking and human intelligence. In R. 1.
Sternberg (Ed.), Advances in the psychology ofhuman intelligence: Vol. 2. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Holyoak, K. 1., & Koh, K. (1987). Surface and structural similarity in analogical
transfer. Memory and Cognition. 15.332-340.
Holyoak, K. 1., Novick, L. R., & Melz, E. R. (1994). Component processes in
analogical transfer: Mapping, pattern completion, and adaptation. In K. 1. Holyoak & 1.
B. Bamden (Eds.), Advances in connectionist and neural computation theory: Analogical
58
connections (Vol. 2, pp. 113-181). Norwood, NJ: Ab1ex.
Holyoak, K. 1, & Thagard, P. (1995). Mental leaps: Analogy in creative thought.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Inhelder, B. & Piaget, J. (1958). The growth oflogical thinking from childhood to
adolescence (E. A. Lunzer & D. Papert, Trans.). New York: Basic Books.
James, W. (1890). The principles ofpsychology. (Vol.2). New York: Holt.
Kemler, D. G., & Smith, L. B. (1979). Accessing similarity and dimensional
relations: Effects of integrality and separability on the discovery of complex concepts.
Journal ofExperimental Psychology: General. 108.2, 133-150.
Klahr, D., & Wallace, 1 G. (1976). Cognitive development: An information
processing view. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Kolbert, L. L. (1985). Aging and the allocation of attentional resources: The
influence of stimulus structure. preattentive organization and automaticity. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Brown University, Providence, RI.
Kotovsky, L., & Gentner, D. (1996). Comparison and categorization in the
development of relational similarity. Child Development. 67. 2798-2822.
Kuczaj, S. A. (1999). Discussion: The role of analogy in conceptual development.
Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development,
Albuquerque, NM.
Miller, P. H. (1993). Theories of developmental psychology. New York: W. H.
Freeman.
59
Levinson, P. J., & Carpenter, R. L. (1974). Analysis of analogical reasoning in
children. Child Development. 45. 857-861.
Piaget,1. (1954). The construction of reality in the child. NY: Basic Books.
Piaget, J. (1979). Correspondences and transformations. In F. B. Murray (Ed.)
The impact ofPiagetian theory: On philosophy. psychiatry and psychology (pp.17-27).
Baltimore, MD: University Park Press
Piaget, J. (1985). The equilibration of cognitive structures. (T. Brown & K. 1.
Thampy, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Reeves, L. M., & Weisberg, R. W. (1994). The role ofcontent and abstract
infonnation in analogical transfer. Psychological Bulletin, 115.3,381-400
Rosser, R. (1994). Cognitive development. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
Shepp, B. E. (1982), The analyzability ofmultidimensional stimuli: Some
constraints on perceived structure, the development ofperceived structure, and attention.
In T. J. Tighe & B. E. Shepp (Eds.), Perception. cognition, and development:
Interactional analyses (pp.39-72), Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Shepp, B. E. (1989). On perceiving objects: Holistic versus featural properties. In
B. E. Shepp & S. Ballesteros (Eds.) Object Perception: Structure and Process (pp. 203-
233). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum
Shepp, B. E., & Swartz, K. B. (1976). Selective attention and the processing of
integral and nonintegral dimensions: A developmental study. Journal ofExperimental
Psychology. 22. 73-85.
60
Shepp, B. E., Bums, B. & McDonough, D. (1980). The relation of stimulus
structure to perceptual and cognitive development: Further tests of a separability
hypothesis. In 1. Becker & F. Wilening (Eds.), The integration of information by children
(pp. 113-146), Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Siegler, R. S. (1998). Children's thinking. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Smith, 1. B. (1989) A model ofperceptual classification in children and adults.
Psychological Review. 96. 1, 125-144.
Smith, 1. B. (199i). Perceptual structure and developmental process. In G. R.
Lockhead & 1. R. Pomerantz (Eds.), The perception of structure (pp. 297-315),
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Smith, 1. B., & Heise, D. (1992). Perceptual similarity and conceptual structure.
In B. Bums (Ed.), Percepts. concepts and categories the representation and processing of
information, (pp. 233-272). NY: North Holland.
Smith,1. B., & Kemler, D. G. (1977). Developmental trends in free
classification: Evidence for a new conceptualization ofperceptual development. Joumal
of Experimental Child Psychology. 24. 279-298.
Smith, 1. B. , & Katz, D. B. (1996). Activity-dependent processes in perceptual
and cognitive development. In R. Gelman & T. Kit-Fong Au (Eds.) Perceptual and
cognitive development (pp. 413-445). New York: Academic Press
Spellman, B. A., & Holyoak, K. 1. (1992) If Saddam is Hitler then who is George
Bush? Analogical mapping between systems of social roles. Journal ofPersonality and
61
..
Social Psychology. 62. 913-933.
Sternberg, R. 1. (1977a) Component processes in analogical reasoning.
Psychological Review. 84. 4, 353-378.
Sternberg, R. 1. (1977b) Intelligence. information processing. and analogical
reasoning: The componential analysis ofhuman intelligence. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Sternberg, R. 1., & Nigro, G. (1980). Developmental patterns in the solution of
verbal analogies. Child Development. 51. 27-38.
Sternberg, R. 1., & Rifkin, B. (1979). The development of analogical reasoning
processes. Journal ofExperimental Child Psychology. 27. 195-232.
Vosniadou, S., & Ortony, A. (1989) Similarity and analogical reasoning: A
synthesis. In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony (Eds.) Similarity and analogical reasoning (pp.
1-17). New York: Cambridge.
Vurpillot, E. & Moal, A. (1968). Evolution des criteres d'identite chez enfants
d'age prescolaire dans une tache de differenciation perceptive (A. Nicolopoulou, Trans.).
Annee Psychologie. 70, 391-406.
Wadsworth, B. 1. (1979). Piaget's theoty ofcognitive development. New York:
Longman.
Wadsworth, B. J. (1996). Piaget's theoty of cognitive and affective development.
New York: Longman.
62
Footnotes
1. The base analog refers to the terms from which the inference and mapping are
derived, the 'A' and 'B' terms; the target analog refers to the terms to which the
inference and mapping are applied, the 'C' and 'D' terms.
2. The raw data for this study were collected in Rhode Island before I became
affiliated with this project. A study such as this clearly depends on a school
environment that is supportive of academic research. We are truly grateful to the
teachers, principals, and, most importantly, the children and their parents for
happily putting up with the inconvenience and disruption associated with data
collection.
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